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Joseph W Geary * and David Mark Davenport**
I. ZONING AND PLANNING
A. Texas Supreme Court
HE Texas Supreme Court decided two important zoning cases dur-
ing the survey period. The most significant was Teer v. Duddles-
'en, i  which two homeowners sought a declaratory judgment that
two zoning ordinances passed by the city of Bellaire were invalid. The
homeowners first challenged the general validity of the city's zoning classi-
fication known as the Planned Development District (PDD).2 The home-
* B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Geary, Stahl & Spen-
cer, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., Central State University; J.D., University of Oklahoma. Attorney at Law,
Geary, Stahl & Spencer, Dallas, Texas.
1. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 544 (July 20, 1983). Immediately prior to this Article's going to
press, the Texas Supreme Court granted a motion for rehearing of cause in Teer v. Duddles-
ten. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 246 (Feb. 22, 1984). The supreme court vacated and withdrew its
original opinion and substituted a new opinion in its place. The new opinion in Teer adopts
the position of the dissent in the original opinion. In that opinion, Justice Ray, joined by
Justice McGee, argued that the court should dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Justice Ray's argument was based on the fact that the trial court judgment purported to
grant summary judgment relief to the defendant city of Bellaire when the city failed to file a
motion requesting such relief or to produce evidence showing itself entitled to such relief.
Consequently, the dissent concluded that although the majority's conclusion as to the merits
of the case was correct, the trial court's order was not final and, therefore, nonappealable. 26
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 550. The majority, however, rejected this argument because the issue in
Teer was the validity of the two zoning ordinances. Having concluded that the disputed
ordinances were valid, the majority reasoned that the trial court had disposed of all material
issues in the case and that the declaratory judgment order was appealable. Id.
In the court's new opinion the dissent's position in the original opinion was adopted as the
majority position, and the case was remanded for trial as to the city of Bellaire. The
supreme court held that the trial court should have granted a partial summary judgment in
favor of the defendant-developers but not the city of Bellaire. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 248.
Justice Robertson, joined by Justice Kilgarlin, dissented in the new opinion on the basis of
the original majority opinion and argued that a remand would needlessly waste the time and
efforts of the trial court and the party litigants. Id at 249.
Due to substantial time constraints and the fact that the original dissent in Teer agreed
with the original majority decision as to the merits of the case, the authors have made the
conscious decision to leave the textual discussion of Teer intact. The authors feel that be-
cause the majority and the dissent were in agreement as to the merits of the case, the major-
ity's discussion of the law in the original opinion is still worthy of discussion and should
offer some instruction to the attorney practicing in the area of zoning law in Texas.
2. A Planned Development District is a unique method of zoning that allows the city
to defer a decision on how particular property may be used until such time as the property
owner presents plans to the city outlining the manner in which he proposes to develop the
property. This method allows the city considerable flexibility in developing a pattern of
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owners also challenged a second ordinance amending the PDD to allow
the specific use proposed by Duddlesten.
Duddlesten sought approval of development plans for a thirty-eight-acre
tract of land abutting Teer's property. Because the land in question was
zoned PDD, Duddlesten made application to the city requesting an
amendment to the PDD ordinance allowing him to construct an office, ho-
tel, and restaurant complex in accordance with certain site plans and speci-
fications. Duddlesten's plans, however, failed to comply with a number of
general city building standards and regulations, such as minimum setback,
building height, and parking space requirements. The city council ap-
proved Duddlesten's request, suspended the conflicting regulations insofar
as they applied to his property, and passed the amended ordinance author-
izing the particular use sought. In return for city approval of his plans,
Duddlesten agreed to dedicate ten acres of the tract as "Passive Open
Space."
Teer contended that use of the PDD was not authorized by and, more-
over, was in conflict with the Texas Zoning Enabling Act.3 The court rec-
ognized the issue as one of first impression in Texas, 4 and then discussed
the advantages of flexibility afforded both the city and the developer by
use of the PDD.5 In response to Teer's first argument that PDDs were not
specifically authorized by the Act, the court stated that the language in the
Act authorizing local governments "to create 'districts of such number,
shape, and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of
this Act'" was sufficient to confer authority on the city to use the PDD.6
The court rejected Teer's contention that certain provisions of the Act re-
quiring uniform regulations and restrictions inside each district conflicted
with the use of a PDD, because the height and setback requirements
within the PDD applied equally to all development inside the district.7
growth since it permits several different uses of property in the same general area. Typically,
the developer will present site plans and specifications regarding his proposed use of the
property to the local governing body and request thzt such governing body amend the PDD
ordinance to allow the particular use. Id. at 545.
3. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 101la-lolm (Vernon 1963 & Pam. Supp. 1963-
1983).
4. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 547. The court cited cases construing the requirements of a
PDD, but stated that none had raised the fundamental question concerning its general valid-
ity. See, e.g., Charleston Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. LaCoke, 507 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (upholding PDD for single-family attached dwellings);
Rhodes v. Shapiro, 494 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ) (holding city
planning commission had no authority to make issuance of building permit conditional);
ichols v. City of Dallas, 347 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(upholding validity of zoning hearings); Clesi v. Northwest Dallas Imp. Ass'n, 263 S.W.2d
820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ refd n.r.e.) (upholding zoning amendment allowing
apartment construction).
5. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 547. Specifically, the court noted that the use of a PDD could
serve as a buffer zone between two dissimilar zoning districts and thereby achieve a more
harmonious blend between the two districts rather than a stark contrast. The same argu-
ment would apply to two different districts where one contained very old, rundown portions
of a city and the other contained new development. Id.
6. Id. at 548 (quoting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011b (Vernon 1963)).
7. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 548. Article 101 lb requires that regulations and restrictions
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Teer also alleged that PDDs amounted to spot zoning.8 The court dis-
missed the argument, stating that the single most determinative factor in
ascertaining the existence of spot zoning is whether the tract of land zoned
is large enough to sustain self-contained development.9 The thirty-eight
acre tract of land in Duddlesten clearly met the test.
Teer's second major argument was that the amended ordinance was spe-
cially tailored to meet Duddlesten's site plans and, therefore, amounted to
illegal contract zoning. Teer based this argument on grounds that
(1) Duddlesten's tract of land was exempt from all future statutory amend-
ments regarding the erection of signs; (2) the city was obligated to reim-
burse Duddlesten partially for its share of public improvements made by
him; (3) all rights and privileges granted to Duddlesten by the amended
ordinance were personal to Duddlesten and could not be transferred with-
out city approval; and (4) final approval of Duddlesten's site plans was
expressly conditioned upon his executing an Acceptance Agreement
whereby he accepted certain conditions required by the city in return for
granting his zoning request. The city's approval of Duddlesten's site plans
provided that if he failed to execute the Acceptance Agreement within
ninety days, then the approval would become null and void. Finally, Dud-
dlesten was required to offer the city a right of first refusal to purchase the
area dedicated as Passive Open Space should he ever attempt to sell the
same or have it rezoned.
The court initially distinguished contract zoning and conditional zoning.
Contract zoning is a bilateral agreement where the city binds itself to re-
zone land in return for the landowner's promise to use or not use his land
in a certain manner.'0 Conditional zoning, on the other hand, is when the
city unilaterally requires a landowner to accept certain restrictions on his
land without a prior commitment to rezone the land as requested."l The
court held that the amended ordinance in Duddlesten amounted to illegal
contract zoning, and stated:
This attempt to tie the zoning change to Duddlesten individually
within each particular zoning district be uniform, but such regulations and restrictions may
vary from district to district. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1011 b (Vernon 1963).
8. Spot zoning occurs when a particular tract of land is singled out for different treat-
ment than surrounding tracts of land within the same district. Because the Zoning Enabling
Act requires uniformity of zoning, spot zoning is an impermissible manner uf planning de-
velopment. See City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Tex. 1981); Hunt v. City of
San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tex. 1971); Weaver v. Ham, 149 Tex. 309, 318, 232
S.W.2d 704, 709 (1950).
9. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 548; see City of Pharr v. Tippitt, 616 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Tex.
1981).
10. Id. The principal objection to contract zoning is that zoning is a legislative function
and a city cannot contract its legislative power away or surrender its power to make future
changes in the zoning laws. Id;see Nairn v. Bean, 121 Tex. 355, 361, 48 S.W.2d 584, 586
(1932); Bowers v. City of Taylor, 16 S.W.2d 520, 521-22 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding
approved); Fidelity Land & Trust Co. v. City of West Univ. Place, 496 S.W.2d 116, 117
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ refd n.r.e.); City of Farmers Branch v.
Hawnco, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Urso v.
City of Dallas, 221 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1949, writ refd).
11. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 549.
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directly contravenes the fundamental principle that a zoning body
regulates the use of land and not the person who owns it. . . .Zon-
ing determinations should be based solely upon the real estate and its
use, and not in any way turn on who owns or intends to occupy it.
Consequently, courts disfavor stipulations of this type in zoning ordi-
nances which make the legislation personal to the applicant.12
The Texas Supreme Court's other important decision during the survey
period was Marriott v. City of Dallas.'3 The court held that a drafting
error on a zoning map indicating that a tract of land was zoned temporary
agricultural did not change the city's Comprehensive Zoning Plan ordi-
nance, which had zoned the property permanent agricultural.' 4 In 1965
the city of Dallas, pursuant to its Comprehensive Zoning Plan, zoned Mar-
riott's property as permanent agricultural. The Marriott property, how-
ever, appeared on the city's zoning map as temporary agricultural. In 1977
the Marriotts hired a contractor to begin construction of a catfish farm, a
use permitted under the agricultural zoning classification. The contractor
excavated a substantial amount of sand and gravel from the property, leav-
ing a pit twenty-one feet deep.
The city of Dallas alleged that the activity went beyond the mere con-
struction of a catfish farm and became a large-scale mining operation, a
use prohibited under the agricultural classification. The city obtained an
order permanently enjoining the Marriotts from excavating stone, sand,
and gravel from their property without a special use permit. 15 The Marri-
otts appealed the order, arguing that the temporary classification had
lasted for sixteen years, thereby rendering the general ordinance invalid
due to the unreasonable length of time the property had been subject to the
temporary classification. The Marriotts contended, therefore, that no zon-
ing at all covered the property.
The supreme court held that the unauthorized and mistaken designation
appearing on the zoning map did not change the land's permanent agricul-
tural classification as shown in the city's Comprehensive Zoning Plan.' 6
Quoting from its opinion in City of Hutchins v. Prasijka, 17 the court stated
that " '[w]hile the method, or lack of it, of the City of Hutchins with regard
to its zoning ordinances, regulations, and maps, leaves a great deal to be
desired, the zoning laws of a city may not be changed by unauthorized
12. Id at 549-50; see Huntington v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 428 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1981); Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist., 101 N.H. 460, 146 A.2d 257,
260 (1958); Dexter v. Town Bd., 36 N.Y.2d 102, 105, 324 N.E.2d 870, 871, 365 N.Y.S.2d 506,
508 (1975); Fox v. Shriver-Allison Co., 28 Ohio App. 2d 175, 181, 275 N.E.2d 637, 641
(1971). See generally Strine, The Use of Conditions in Land- Use Control, 67 DICK. L. REV.
109 (1963).
13. 644 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1983).
14. Id at 471-72.
15. A special use permit is issued by the local Board of Adjustment. It authorizes the
recipient to use the property inside the zoning district in a manner not expressly authorized
by the applicable ordinance.
16. Id. at 472.
17. 450 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1970).
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resolution or by the unauthorized changing of zoning maps.' "18 The in-
junction was, therefore, appropriate under the circumstances.' 9
B. Courts of Appeals
The courts of appeals decided several zoning cases during the survey
period. In Austin Neighborhoods Council, Inc. v. Board ofAdjustment 20 the
appellants challenged the local building department's issuance of a build-
ing permit for construction of an office building in downtown Austin.21
The appellants appealed to the local board of adjustment, which upheld
issuance of the permit. Appellants then appealed to the district court,
which affirmed the decision of the board. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court decision.22
The recipient of the building permit joined the action and objected at
every stage of the proceedings to appellants' lack of standing to appeal the
original issuance of the building permit. Under article 1011 g(d) of the
Zoning Enabling Act, "[aippeals to the Board of Adjustment may be taken
by any person aggrieved or by any officer, department, board, or bureau of
the municipality affected by any decision of the administrative officer."'23
The court of appeals agreed that Neighborhoods Council lacked standing
under the statute to appeal to the board of adjustment 24 and quoted from
the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Scott v. Board of Adjustment. 25 In
Scott the supreme court interpreted article 101 lg(d) to mean that "[w]here
the statute requires that the person be interested, affected, or aggrieved
. . . the plaintiff must allege and show how he had been injured or dam-
aged other than as a member of the general public .... ,,26 Neighbor-
hoods Council could not show any specific injury and therefore could not
meet the standing requirement.27
In the alternative, the appellants contended that since a member of the
Austin city council joined as a plaintiff in the action they had the requisite
18. 644 S.W.2d at 472 (quoting 450 S.W.2d at 836).
19. 644 S.W.2d at 472. In the alternative the Marriotts argued that if the zoning map
error had not classified their property as temporary agricultural for an unreasonable length
of time, then the city's Comprehensive Zoning Plan had done so. This argument was based
upon certain language in the comprehensive ordinance purporting to zone newly annexed
territories as temporary agricultural. Because the property in question was arnexed in 1962,
the Marriotts contended that the temporary agricultural classification, as applied to newly
annexed territories, had applied to their property since 1962. In overruling this final point of
error the court held that the ordinance provision applied only to areas newly annexed after
the passage of the 1965 Comprehensive Zoning Plan, and since the Marriot property was
annexed in 1962, the 1965 ordinance permanently zoned the Marriott's property as agricul-
tural. Id. at 472-73.
20. 644 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
21. Appellants included the Austin Neighborhoods Council, Inc., a nonprofit corpora-
tion, its president, and a member of the city council.
22. 644 S.W.2d at 561-62.
23. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1011 g(d) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983).
24. 644 S.W.2d at 563.
25. 405 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1966).
26. 644 S.W.2d at 563 (quoting 405 S.W.2d at 56).
27. 644 S.W.2d at 563.
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standing because of the councilman's status as an officer of the city.28 The
court held that under Texas law an individual may act as an officer of a
municipality only when (1) his acts are within the scope of his authority or
(2) his acts are ratified or adopted by the municipality. 29 Expressing disa-
greement with the appellant's contention that actual authority is unneces-
sary and finding no such authority or municipal ratification in the record,
the court dismissed the appellant's alternative argument.30 Finally, the ap-
pellants argued that even if they did not have the requisite standing to
appeal to the board of adjustment, they nevertheless had standing to ap-
peal to the trial court under section (j) of article 101 lg, because at least two
of the appellants were individual taxpayers.3' The court held that stand-
ing to appeal to the board of adjustment was a prerequisite to standing to
appeal to a court of record as provided in section (j) of article 1011g. 32
Since the appellants lacked standing to appeal in the first instance, they
necessarily lacked standing to appeal to the trial court.
In Texans to Save the Capital, Inc. v. Board ofAdustment,33 a case very
similar to Austin Neighborhoods Council, the Austin court of appeals af-
firmed the board of adjustment's interpretation of a local zoning ordinance
establishing maximum height limitations for buildings constructed in
downtown Austin. The ordinance provided that each building could ex-
ceed the maximum height limitations by three feet for every one foot it was
set back from the streetline. 34 The court gave great weight to the board of
adjustment's construction of the admittedly ambiguous ordinance and
agreed that a setback was an imaginary plane running parallel to the
building from the streetline, rising vertically upward to the sky. 35 The
28. Id. at 564. Article 101 Ig provides for appeal by "any officer... of the municipality
affected by any decision." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 101 lg(d) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1963-1983).
29. 644 S.W.2d at 564; see Foster v. City of Waco, 113 Tex. 352, 355, 255 S.W. 1104,
1106 (1923); Hallman v. City of Pampa, 147 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1941, writ ref'd).
30. 644 S.W.2d at 564-65.
31. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011 g(j) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983) provides
that "[a]ny person ... aggrieved by any decision of the Board of Adjustment, or any tax-
payer, or any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality, may present to a
court of record a petition . . . setting forth that such decision is illegal .... " (Emphasis
added.) It is important to note that standing under this provision includes a taxpayer while
art. 101 lg(d) does not.
32. 644 S.W.2d at 563.
33. 647 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The appellants in Tex-
ans to Save the Capital contested a building permit issued to the same party as in Austin
Neighborhoods Council, but covering an adjacent piece of property. Because of its holding
in Austin Neighborhoods Council the court seriously doubted that the appellants had stand-
ing to bring the instant appeal, but decided to proceed to the merits in "an overabundance of
caution." Id at 775.
34. The ordinance reads as follows: "HEIGHT. No building shall exceed a height of
two hundred feet on the streetline, provided, that the height of the building may be in-
creased above two hundred feet by increasing the height three feet for each foot setback
from the streetline." Id. (emphasis supplied by court).
35. Id. at 776. Texas case law holds that where a statute or ordinance is ambiguous or
unclear, the administrative agency's interpretation of that statute or ordinance is to be ac-
corded great weight. See Calvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex. 1968); State v. Aran-
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court disagreed with the appellant's contention that the ordinance contem-
plated only one setback per building, which was at street level, and empha-
sized that the board's interpretation "allows a 'wedding cake' or 'pyramid-
like' structure to rise above the 200 feet limitation . . . by employing the
• . . three-for-one bonus exception. '36
In Eudaly v. City of Coffeyville37 the appellant sought to invalidate four
amended zoning ordinances, claiming that certain meetings held prior to
passage of the ordinances were in violation of various state statutes, city
ordinances, and the general city charter. Appellee-intervenors had at-
tempted to secure rezoning of four tracts of land in Coffeyville. They first
met with the city's planning and zoning commission at a regular session
workshop to discuss certain concerns the commission had regarding the
rezoning. Afterward the commission held a public hearing and recom-
mended approval of the rezoning to the city council. The city council then
held three public hearings and an emergency meeting before voting to ap-
prove the rezoning.
Appellant contended that the workshop session and the emergency
meeting violated articles 1011lP8 and 101 1d39 of the Texas Zoning En-
abling Act. Appellant also alleged that both meetings were in violation of
certain city ordinances. The court concluded that the provisions of articles
101 If and 101 ld did not apply to the meetings in question because neither
meeting was a public hearing within the meaning of the statute.40 The
court stated that "the term 'public hearing' contemplates the opening of
the floor for public comment by anyone desiring to speak on the issue of
concern. . . Comments by the public at large were neither solicited nor
heard."'4 ' The court dismissed the appellants' points of error regarding the
city ordinance and charter for failure to raise such points at the trial level,
and affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects.42
In Fountain Gate Ministries, Inc. v. City of Piano43 the city of Plano ob-
tained an injunction prohibiting a religious organization from conducting
certain activities related to operating a college. Fountain Gate Ministries,
Inc. owned twenty-one acres of land in an area zoned single family with
sas Dock & Channel Co., 365 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ
refd); cf. Citizens Nat'1 Bank v. Calvert, 527 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tex. 1975) (administrative
interpretation disregarded when it conflicts with statute's plain meaning).
36. 647 S.W.2d at 776.
37. 642 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
38. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 101 lf(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983) provides
that public hearings before a home rule city's zoning commission shall be preceded by writ-
ten notice to all property owners located within 200 feet of the property being rezoned. Such
notice shall be received within 10 days of the proposed public hearings.
39. Id. art. 101 ld (Vernon 1963) provides that a municipality may provide for its own
manner of zoning on the condition that any action taken by the municipality be preceded by
(1) a public hearing and (2) at least 15-days' notice stating the time and place of such
hearing.
40. 642 S.W.2d at 77.
41. Id
42. Id. at 77-78.
43. 654 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
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special use exceptions for a church and a school, public or parochial. The
ordinance specifically prohibited the use of land "for a boarding house,
rooming house, child care center, and college or university."" After the
city denied appellant's application for a special use permit allowing it to
operate a college or university, Fountain Gate declared that such a permit
was unnecessary because the church and college activities were so closely
related that the latter fell within the ordinance's special use exception for
the church. The trial court disagreed with the appellant's position and is-
sued the order of injunction from which Fountain Gate appealed.
On appeal, Fountain Gate argued that not only did the college activities
in question fall within the church use exception, but the injunction was
also inappropriate because it infringed upon the church's right of religious
freedom guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. The court of appeals held that operation of a college was not an
activity protected under the first amendment and that the zoning ordi-
nance limiting the activities of Fountain Gate was a legitimate exercise of
the state's police power.45 The court further held that the ordinance's spe-
cial use exception for the church could not be extended to include the op-
eration of the college simply because the activities of the two were closely
related and the college activities consisted, to some degree, of worship.46
II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND CONDEMNATION
Although the Texas Supreme Court rendered no noteworthy decisions
regarding proceedings in eminent domain or condemnation during the sur-
vey period, several interesting decisions were announced by the Texas
courts of appeals and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
A. Texas Courts of Appeals
In City ofAustin v. Casiraghi 47 the Austin court of appeals held that the
appellee-landowner could not be awarded damages for the loss of his res-
taurant business independently of the award for the realty upon which the
business was located, without pleading a cause of action in inverse con-
demnation. 48 In Casiraghi the city of Austin condemned three lots upon
which the appellee-landowner operated a very profitable restaurant busi-
ness. The parties stipulated at trial that the total market value of the three
44. Id at 842.
45. Id at 844.
46. Id at 845; see Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1970, writ refd n.r.e.) (day-care center properly prohibited notwithstanding fact that it was
located within rectory of Episcopal vicar); Coe v. City of Dallas, 266 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1953, no writ) (proposed building consisting of 2400 square feet of space
for prayer and healing rooms and 600 square feet for church was not church and, therefore,
properly prohibited by zoning ordinance).
47. 656 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
48. Inverse condemnation is a cause of action pleaded by a landowner claiming that the
condemning governmental authority has damaged or taken his property for a public purpose
without providing just compensation for that loss as required by TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17,
and U.S. CONST. amend. V. 656 S.W.2d at 580.
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lots including improvements was $55,000. The appellee-landowner, how-
ever, over appellant's objection, introduced expert testimony to show that
the intangible value of his restaurant business alone was $130,000. The
jury responded to the trial court's instruction on the issue by awarding the
appellee $130,000 for loss of his business in addition to the $55,000
awarded for the value of the land and improvements.
On appeal, the court held that the trial court erred in issuing the special
instruction regarding the value of appellee's business, and reformed the
trial court's judgment to reflect a total award of $55,000, the value of the
land and improvements alone.49  The court reasoned that damages
awarded in a condemnation proceeding are limited by statute to those
damages resulting from a taking of the specific property described in the
condemning authority's petition. 0 The court did acknowledge that at
least one other Texas case had allowed a landowner to recover damages in
a condemnation proceeding for the depreciated value of his business,5 ' but
distinguished that case from the instant one. In the prior case the land-
owner had introduced evidence of the value of his business solely as it
related to the value of the real property being condemned, and not as a
separate and independent item of damage.5 2
The Casiraghi court further held that the general profitability of a busi-
ness is not a proper item of damages in a condemnation proceeding if
(1) such damages represent only goodwill or a going concern value of the
landowner's business,5 3 or (2) the landowner's property is condemned in
whole rather than in part.54 Finally, the court held that because the award
for loss of appellee's business was not authorized by the statute under
which the condemnation proceedings had been initiated, the award could
be sustained only in a cause of action alleging inverse condemnation,
49. 656 S.W.2d at 581-83.
50. Id. at 582. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3264 (Vernon 1968) provides that the
condemning authority shall file a petition in the appropriate court describing the property to
be condemned. In Casiraghi the property description included only the three particular lots
on which the appellee's business was situated and did not include the intangible value of the
restaurant business located thereon. 656 S.W.2d at 579; see Queen City Land Co. v. State,
601 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (award of fee simple
title to state in eminent domain proceeding is error where petition in condemnation sought
only an easement).
51. Milam County v. Akers, 181 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1944, writ ref'd
w.o.m.) (allowed request of damages for loss of cattle business in partial taking where such
damages were alleged to affect market value of farm being condemned).
52. 656 S.W.2d at 580-81. Compare City of Dallas v. Priolo, 150 Tex. 423, 242 S.W.2d
176 (1951) (trial court did not err in excluding evidence of depreciated market value of
grocery and liquor business as separate items of damage); with State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex.
604, 89 S.W.2d 194 (1936) (error to instruct jury to consider special items of damage as
affecting remainder of property in partial taking).
53. 656 S.W.2d at 851; see State v. Zaruba, 418 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Tex. 1967) (land-
owner's testimony as to value of business included improper elements of goodwill and go-
ing-concern value).
54. 656 S.W.2d at 581; see Herndon v. Housing Auth., 261 S.W.2d 221, 222-23 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd) (evidence of profitability of landowner's business prop-
erly excluded by trial court, even though offered as evidence of the market value of the real
estate, where whole of landowner's property taken by condemnor).
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which the appellee failed to plead. 55 Accordingly, the court sustained the
appellant's point of error and held that the trial court's award for the lost
value of appellee's business was not adequately supported by the
pleadings. 56
Zinsmeyer v. State 7 involved a dispute over the proper amount of dam-
ages in a condemnation proceeding. The San Antonio court of appeals
held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury fully as to the appel-
lant-landowner's loss of a water easement required reversal.5 8 In Zin-
smeyer the State of Texas and Medina County jointly condemned property
conveyed to Zinsmeyer by his father. The property conveyed included an
easement for Zinsmeyer's use of a water well located on his father's re-
maining property. The state had already condemned the father's fee es-
tate, including the water well, and had appropriately compensated him for
it. The trial court, over the appellant's objection, refused to instruct the
jury (1) to ignore the previous award to the father, and (2) that appellant's
water easement was a valuable property right, separate from the fee estate,
that deserved compensation. Zinsmeyer contended on appeal that such
refusal constituted reversible error.
The court of appeals acknowledged that the holder of an easement de-
serves just compensation when that easement is extinguished by public
condemnation. It held that the trial court erred in not fully instructing the
jury as to the nature of the appellant's rights as holder of the water ease-
ment, as distinguished from the father's rights as fee owner of the servient
estate.59 Quoting from its opinion in Ruble v. City of San Antonio ,60 the
court stated:
[W]e think it equally important in a case where the fee being taken is
incumbered by an easement, that appropriate instructions be also
given by the court as to the nature of the easement to which the prop-
erty is subject, setting forth in some detail the rights, privileges and
limitations of both the landowner and the easement holder .... 61
In Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co. v. Fischer62 the appellee moved for
summary dismissal of appellant's condemnation petition on the basis of a
jury finding that appellant's proposed use of the property was not a public
one and, therefore, it had no authority to bring the action. The trial court
disregarded the jury's finding and awarded appellee damages for the tak-
ing of his land. In upholding the trial court's refusal to follow the jury's
55. 656 S.W.2d at 580. Contrary to the majority's opinion in Casiraghi, the dissent
forcefully argued that the appellees had, in fact, pleaded the unique quality of their prop-
erty; and, even if they had not, the issue was tried by consent. Id. at 584 (Phillips, C.J.,
dissenting).
56. Id. at 583.
57. 646 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
58. Id. at 629.
59. Id. at 628-29; see Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Shell Pipeline Corp., 578
S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston fist Dist.]), afl'd, 591 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1979).
60. 479 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. 646 S.W.2d at 629 (quoting 479 S.W.2d at 89).
62. 653 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
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finding, the court of appeals cited several Texas cases holding that whether
a given set of facts constitutes a public or private use is a question of law,
not one of fact.63
The court stated that the test for determining whether a particular use is
public is whether "there results to the public some definite right or use in
the business or undertaking to which the property is devoted."' 64 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that there was a public use by virtue of the
company's statutory obligation to refrain from discriminating in price or
service in its sales to individual members of the public.65 The court also
noted that the Texas Legislature had delegated its power of condemnation
to the company, recognizing that use as public; such a declaration by the
legislature is binding on the courts unless it is manifestly wrong or unrea-
sonable.66 The court held that the company had authority to condemn the
appellee's property because the use in question was public and the delega-
tion of power by the legislature not manifestly wrong or unreasonable.
67
In City of Houston v. Blackbird68 the city, at the appellee's request, had
dismissed its suit to condemn the appellee's property. The trial court then
awarded attorneys' fees plus interest to the appellee. The city contended
that an award of attorneys' fees was inappropriate because the action was
dismissed at the request of the appellee, and appellee's property had
greatly increased in value during the proceedings. The court of appeals
rejected the city's position, holding that the language of article 3265, sec-
tion 6 was mandatory. 69 Thus, the court must award the landowner rea-
sonable costs and attorneys' fees whenever the condemning authority, on
its own motion, dismisses or abandons the condemnation proceedings,
notwithstanding the fact that such motion is made at the landowner's
request. 70
63. Id. at 474 (citing DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 110 (Tex. 1965); Housing
Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 165, 143 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940); Dallas Cotton Mills v.
Industrial Co., 296 S.W. 503, 505 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted)).
64. 653 S.W.2d at 475 (quoting Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Pate, 158 Tex. 171,
179, 309 S.W.2d 828, 833 (1958)); accord Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 45-46, 326
S.W.2d 699, 704-06 (1959).
65. 653 S.W.2d at 476; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1438 (Vernon 1980).
66. 653 S.W.2d at 476; seeTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1436 (Vernon 1980) (provid-
ing that corporations who sell gas to public have power to condemn private property for
pipeline easements). The delegation of the legislature's power of eminent domain is given
great weight in determining whether the particular use sanctioned by the legislatu-e is in fact
private rather than public. See Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 45, 326 S.W.2d 699,
704 (1959); Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 165, 143 S.W.2d 79, 83 (1940).
67. 653 S.W.2d at 476.
68. 658 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, no writ).
69. Id. at 271-72. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3265, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1984)
provides:
Where a plaintiff after filing a petition in condemnation, desires to dismiss or
abandon the proceedings, said plaintiff shall by a motion filed to the judge of
the court be heard thereon, and the court hearing the same shall make an
allowance to the landowner for all necessary and reasonable attorneys', ap-
praisers', and photographers' fees and all other expenses incurred to the date
of such hearing on said motion . . ..
70. 658 S.W.2d at 271-72; see also McCullough v. Producers Gas Co., 616 S.W.2d 702
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B. Ffth Circuit Court of Appeals
One of the more controversial cases decided by the Fifth Circuit during
the survey period was United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land.7' The court
considered the issue of whether a private party can recover attorneys' fees
and litigation by expenses from the United States in a condemnation pro-
ceeding brought pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). 72
The appellees had appealed an unfavorable ruling by the district court on
their motion for attorneys' fees under the EAJA, which provides that any
court exercising jurisdiction over any nontort civil action brought by or
against the United States shall award attorneys' fees and litigation ex-
penses to a prevailing party other than the United States unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified. 73
The United States contended that the prefatory language "[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided by statute" 74 indicates the congressional in-
tent to exempt eminent domain cases from coverage under the EAJA.
Support for this position came from the fact that Congress had already
authorized an award of attorneys' fees to a private litigant in condemna-
tion cases brought by the United States when (1) the action was dismissed
prior to judgment as not authorized, or (2) the government had abandoned
its case. 75 In overruling this contention, the court thoroughly examined
the legislative history of the EAJA, recognizing the intent of Congress to
provide a private litigant with sufficient incentive to contest unreasonable
government actions. The court cited such congressional intent as evidence
that the legislature intended the provision for attorneys' fees under the
EAJA to supplement, rather than restrict, other statutory provisions au-
thorizing an award of attorneys' fees in a condemnation proceeding in-
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.) (allowing award of attorney's fees and other
expenses under art. 3265, § 6).
71. 704 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1983).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981). See generaltv Robertson & Fowler, Re-
covering Attorneys'Fees From the Government Under the EqualAccess to Justice Act, 56 TUL.
L. REV. 903 (1982) (background and effect of EAJA).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1981). The statute provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addi-
tion to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in
any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) brought by or against the
United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust.
Id
74. Id
75. 42 U.S.C. § 4654(a) (1976) provides:
The Federal court having jurisdiction of a proceeding instituted by a Fed-
eral agency to acquire real property by condemnation shall award the owner
of any right, or title to, or interest in, such real property such sum as will in the
opinion of the court reimburse such owner for his reasonable costs, disburse-
ments, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineer-
ing fees, actually incurred because of the condemnation proceedings, if-
(1) the final judgment is that the Federal agency cannot acquire the real
property by condemnation; or
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volving the United States. 76
The government argued in the alternative that because the EAJA only
authorized an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party at suit, the
statute did not apply to the instant action. The government contended that
it had successfully condemned the appellee's property and therefore was
the prevailing party. The only remaining dispute, the government argued,
concerned the amount of the condemnation award. The Fifth Circuit re-
jected the government's position and held that any landowner who obtains
a higher award for his property at trial than the government originally
offered is the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees
under the EAJA.77 Having determined that the EAJA authorizes an
award of attorneys' fees against the government in condemnation proceed-
ings, the court remanded the case to the district court for determination of
whether the government's position in contesting the award was substan-
tially justified.78
In United States v. 2,175.86 Acres of Land79 the Fifth Circuit held that
where the government appropriates property pursuant to a straight con-
demnation proceeding, the taking occurs as of the date payment is actually
made by the United States to the landowner and therefore the landowner
is entitled to interest from that date only.80 In the instant case the govern-
ment sought to condemn the landowner's property as part of the Big
Thicket National Preserve, which was established by an act of Congress.
The landowners argued that the date of taking, for purposes of determin-
ing the amount of interest due on the award, was either the date the gov-
ernment had established the preserve or, alternatively, the date of trial.
(2) the proceeding is abandoned by the United States.
76. 704 F.2d at 807.
77. Id at 809; see also Government of Virgin Islands v. 19.623 Acres of Land, 602 F.2d
1130, 1135 (3d Cir. 1979) (construing FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(i) as not preventing award of
attorney's fees to landowner because he is prevailing party in contest for greater
compensation).
78. 704 F.2d at 811. The court also found that the 6% delay damages provided by the
Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1976), and other federal condemnation stat-
utes set a floor, rather than a ceiling, on the rate of interest payable on the amount a land-
owner receives in excess of the amount tendered by the government. 704 F.2d at 812; see
United States v. 429.59 Acres of Land, 612 F.2d 459, 464-65 (9th Cir. 1980) (interest fixed at
rate a reasonably prudent person investing funds for reasonable return would receive);
United States v. Blankinship, 543 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1976) (just compensation in-
cludes interest at a proper rate); Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812, 837 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (6%
held minimum acceptable rate).
79. 696 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1983).
80. Id at 357. The government generally uses one of two methods to appropriate pri-
vate property for a public purpose: (1) it acts under the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C.
§ 258(c) (1976), which vests title to the property in the United States immediately upon a
filing of declaration and deposit with the court of an amount determined to be an appropri-
ate award; or (2) it proceeds in straight condemnation by filing a complaint in condemnation
pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1976), whereby a panel determines the offering price for the
landowner's property but title does not vest in the United States immediately. Since title
vests in the United States automatically when a declaration is filed under 40 U.S.C. § 258(c)




The court relied on Danforth v. United States8' and Agins v. City of
Tiburon82 to support its holding that the landowners were not entitled to
interest on the award. 83
In Danforth the United States Supreme Court reasoned that mere legis-
lative enactment does not constitute a taking because such legislation may
be repealed or modified.84 In Tiburon the Supreme Court held that unless
the United States enters into actual possession of the landowner's property
during the condemnation proceedings, the initiation of such proceedings is
insufficient interference with the landowner's usage of his property to con-
stitute a taking of that property.85 The Fifth Circuit failed to find that the
government had taken possession of the property or substantially inter-
fered with the landowner's use of the property during the condemnation
proceedings. Therefore, the taking occurred when the government ren-
dered payment, and the trial court consequently erred in granting interest
on the landowner's award. 86
In United States v. 50 Acres of Land87 the Fifth Circuit held that just
compensation as mandated by the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution required the government to pay the costs of a functionally
equivalent substitute for a condemned landfill facility. 88 The government
had condemned a sanitary landfill facility owned and operated by the city
of Duncanville, Texas, and claimed that the proper amount of compensa-
tion was the property's fair market value. The city argued that the proper
amount of compensation should be the costs of acquiring a functionally
equivalent substitute facility. 89
Specifically, the government contended that if the condemned property's
fair market value is ascertainable, the valuation must be based on fair mar-
ket value rather than the cost of substitute facilities. 90 The court indicated
81. 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
82. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
83. 696 F.2d at 354-57.
84. 308 U.S. at 286.
85. 447 U.S. at 263 n.9. In Tiburon the Supreme Court also held that fluctuations in a
landowner's property value resulting from the condemnation proceedings or a landowner's
restricted ability to sell his property during such proceedings are not the sort of substantial
interference that will constitute an actual taking by the United States. "Mere fluctuations in
value during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are
'incidents of ownership.'" Id.
86. 696 F.2d at 357.
87. 706 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 1357.
89. The substitute facilities doctrine generally applies to the condemnation of streets,
alleyways, bridges, sewers, and other public facilities for which fair market value cannot be
determined. See, e.g., United States v. Streets, Alleys & Public Ways in Village of Stouts-
ville, 531 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1976) (streets); Town of Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d
238 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953) (sewer); City of Fort Worth v. United
States, 188 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1951) (street and highway); County of Sarpy v. United States,
386 F.2d 453 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (county road and bridge).
90. See United States v. 3,727.91 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 357, 360-61 (8th Cir. 1977);
California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1968). But see United States v.
Certain Property in Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800, 802-03 (2d Cir. 1968) (necessity
could require use of substitute measure despite presence of ascertainable market value).
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that the government's statement of the law was normally correct, but not in
cases where a public entity is obligated to replace the condemned prop-
erty. 9' The court reasoned that because the law required Duncanville to
maintain facilities for the collection and disposal of waste and garbage, the
city was legally obligated to replace the condemned landfill property;
therefore, regardless of whether the fair market value of the property was
readily ascertainable, the proper amount of compensation due to Dun-
canville was the reasonable cost of acquiring a functionally equivalent
substitute facility. 92
III. TAXATION AND ASSESSMENTS
A. Taxation by Independent School Districts
In Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Midland Independent School District93 the
El Paso court of appeals held improper a taxing authority's use of compa-
rable sales of vacant adjacent property as its only method for determining
the market value of a railroad right-of-way on the ground that such prac-
tice constitutes an illegal, arbitrary, and fundamentally erroneous method
of appraising land value for ad valorem tax purposes. 94 The tax assessor
testified that his appraisal of the right-of-way property was based solely on
comparison with recent sales of vacant property lying adjacent to the rail-
road's property. On the authority of the Texas Supreme Court's decisions
in Polk County v. Tenneco, Inc. 95 and Missouri-Kansas Texas Railroad v.
City of Dallas,96 the court held that the taxing authorities erred in basing
their appraisal of appellant's right-of-way property on the recent compara-
ble sales method: the cost to value and income to value approaches should
have been employed.97 In Tenneco and City of Dallas the supreme court
reasoned that in cases involving pipeline and railroad rights-of-way the
91. 706 F.2d at 1360; see United States v. Certain Property in Borough of Manhattan,
403 F.2d 800, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1968) (substitute facilities doctrine applies to condemnation of
public bath and recreation building). "When the public condemnee proves there is a duty to
replace a condemned facility, it is entitled to the cost of constructing a functionally
equivalent substitute, whether that cost be more or less than the market value of the facility
taken." 403 F.2d at 803-04; accord United States v. Certain Property in Borough of Brook-
lyn, 346 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965) (market value rule abandoned when nature of property
or uses produce wide discrepancy between value to owner and price another would pay).
92. 706 F.2d at 1360. The collection and disposal of garbage by a municipality is a
governmental function imposed by law. See City of Fort Worth v. George, 108 S.W.2d 929,
931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1937, writ ref d). Solid waste disposal and sanitary land-
fills are regulated under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
93. 647 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
94. Id at 64-65.
95. 554 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1977).
96. 623 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1981).
97. 647 S.W.2d at 64-65. Market value of real property is generally determined in one
of three ways: cost, income, or market approach. Under the market approach, the appraiser
simply assesses a market value for the condemned property based upon recent sales of com-
parable pieces of property in the same area and bearing the same characteristics. The in-
come approach basically involves ascertaining the present value of future income to be
generated by a piece of property. The cost approach is based on estimates of the current
replacement cost of the property with an adjustment for total depreciation, to derive a pres-
ent market value.
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comparable sales method offers little help in appraising market values be-
cause there are few sales of such properties upon which to base a valua-
tion.98 The court in Midland therefore concluded that the cost and income
approaches should have been utilized in the instant case and reversed the
trial court, remanding the case.99
In Hays Consolidated Independent School District v. Valero Transmission
Co. 100 a procedural error prevented a taxpayer from being relieved of pay-
ing his delinquent ad valorem taxes. The taxpayer failed to allege the ille-
gality of a taxation scheme as an affirmative defense in a suit for
delinquent taxes. The Austin court of appeals held that such failure pre-
cluded the district court from granting judgment in the taxpayer's favor on
the basis of the illegality.101 The lower court had held that the school dis-
trict adopted an unconstitutional, illegal, and therefore void scheme of tax-
ation for the year in question and entered a take-nothing judgment based
upon the taxpayer's general denial. The court of appeals cited the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Alamo Barge Lines, Inc. v. City of Houston 102
for the proposition that a defense to a suit for delinquent taxes alleging
that the tax scheme is illegal or excessive is in the nature of an affirmative
defense and must be specifically pleaded. 0 3 Accordingly, the court held
that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for the taxpayer based on a
general denial. 104
In Manges v. Freer Independent School District 105 the appellant chal-
lenged the authority of a newly created independent school district to levy
ad valorem taxes without conducting a proper election pursuant to article
VII, section 3 of the Texas Constitution. 10 6 The San Antonio court of ap-
peals agreed with the appellant and held that a school district has no in-
herent or implied power to levy taxes for the maintenance of its schools;
98. 623 S.W.2d at 300; 554 S.W.2d at 921.
99. 647 S.W.2d at 65.
100. 645 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
101. Id at 549.
102. 453 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1970), citedin 645 S.W.2d at 546-47. The law in effect for the
tax year in question was TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7329 (Vernon 1960), repealed by
Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 841, § 6(a)(I), 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 2217, 2329 (effective Jan. 1,
1982). The applicable portion states: "There shall be no defense to a suit for collection of
delinquent taxes . . . except . . . [t]hat the taxes sued for are in excess of the limit allowed
by law, but this defense shall apply only to such excess." Id
103. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94 requires an affirmative defense to be specifically pleaded.
104. 645 S.W.2d at 550. The Valero court also reversed the trial court's judgment be-
cause the taxpayer had not sustained his burden by offering evidence as to the amount of the
assessed tax that he alleged represented excess. Id at 549-50, The court held that in addi-
tion to proving that the method employed to value the taxpayer's property was arbitrary and
illegal, where the taxpayer delays his attack on the assessed valuation of his property until
the taxing authority sues to recover the tax as delinquent, he must prove the extent to which
the tax is excessive. Id, see State v. Federal Land Bank, 160 Tex. 282, 287, 329 S.W.2d 847,
850 (1957); City of Arlington v. Cannon, 153 Tex. 566, 572-73, 271 S.W.2d 414, 418 (1954).
105. 653 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
106. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 3 provides that a school district may levy ad valorem taxes
for the maintenance of public schools when legislative funds are insufficient, provided that
such taxes are approved by a majority of qualified voters residing within the district at an
election held for that purpose.
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article VII, section 3 is the exclusive source of authority to levy such
taxes. 0 7 The court concluded that an election under section 3 is
mandatory and any attempt to assess an ad valorem tax without holding
such an election is void.'0 8 The fact that such an election had not been
held by the newly created school district was undisputed.
Initially the appellees argued that the tax in question was authorized by
article 1027, which allows a municipality to levy taxes for free public
schools and educational institutions within the city limits. 0 9 The appel-
lees alternatively urged the court to uphold the levy as validated by article
7057(g), which was designed to validate all otherwise unenforceable tax
levies assessed prior to its passage. 10 Appellees based their final conten-
tion in support of the levy upon article VII, section 3-b of the Texas Con-
stitution."' Under that section a school district may levy taxes and
assessments on property that is newly annexed as part of the district terri-
tory without holding a new election specifically to authorize such new and
additional assessments.
The court held inapplicable the statutory authority relied on by the ap-
pellees in their first contention, because the appellant's property was in a
portion of the new district that lay outside the city limits."12 The second
argument was without merit because the legislature cannot validate an un-
constitutional act."13 In Manges the district imposed the tax levy without
holding the constitutionally required election. Finally, the court held that
section 3-b of article VII applied only to situations in which the district
had previously held the constitutionally required election prior to annex-
ing the new area, and was inapplicable when the district had never held
107. 653 S.W.2d at 558. The court cited several cases in support of its holding. See, e.g.,
Crabb v. Celeste Indep. School Dist., 105 Tex. 194, 146 S.W. 528 (1912) (exclusive authority
for independent school district's levy of ad valorem taxes is article VII, § 3 of Texas Consti-
tution); City of Fort Worth v. Davis, 57 Tex. 225 (1882) (authority to levy taxes must arise
from affirmative grant of power by legislature); Wingate v. Whitney Indep. School Dist., 129
S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1939, no writ) (independent school district has no inher-
ent or implied power to levy taxes for maintenance of public schools).
108. 653 S.W.2d at 558.
109. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1027 (Vernon 1963). The appellee also urged the
court to read article XI, § 4 of the Texas Constitution, delegating to cities legislative power
to levy ad valorem taxes, and TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1027 (Vernon 1963), authoriz-
ing cities to levy taxes for maintenance of public schools within city limits, in conjunction as
supplying the school district with authority to levy ad valorem taxes on property coextensive
with city boundaries to its public school system. 653 S.W.2d at 559-60.
110. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7057(g) (Vernon 1980).
111. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3-b provides:
No tax for the maintenance of public free schools voted in any independent
school district . . . nor any bonds voted in any such district, but unissued,
shall be abrogated, cancelled or invalidated by change of any kind in the
boundaries thereof. After any change in boundaries, the governing body of
any such district, without the necessity of an additional election, shall have the
power to assess, levy and collect ad valorem taxes on all taxable property
within the boundaries of the district as changed ....
112. 653 S.W.2d at 560.
113. Id at 562; see Bigfoot Indep. School Dist. v. Genard, 116 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1938), aff'd, 133 Tex. 368, 129 S.W.2d 1213 (1939).
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the constitutionally required election. 1 4
During the survey period, two interesting cases arose involving the taxa-
tion of religious organizations. In Highland Church of Christ v. Powel115
the Eastland court of appeals held that thirty-five percent of a religious
facility used exclusively as a place of religious worship was exempt from
ad valorem taxation and the remaining sixty-five percent, being leased to
commercial tenants, was subject to taxation. 1 6 The court rejected the ap-
pellee's position that the entire religious facility must be used exclusively
for religious worship to qualify for the statutory exemption from ad
valorem taxation. " 7
The case of Christian Jew Foundation v. State1 8 held that the Texas Em-
ployment Commission's (TEC) interpretation of article 5221b-
17(g)(5)(E) 1'9 was without merit. The statute provides an exemption from
contributions to the Unemployment Compensation Fund for those services
"performed in the employ of a church."'120 The TEC argued that because
the Christian Jew Foundation did not adhere to a recognized and distinct
creed, had no regular place of worship, consisted of only twelve members,
and conducted no regular services other than Bible study, it did not come
within the meaning of the word "church" as provided in the statute and
therefore the exemption was unavailable to it.' 12
The Austin court of appeals held that the TEC's order denying the ex-
emption to the appellant on the basis that the foundation was not a body
of Christian believers sharing the same creed was flagrantly unconstitu-
tional. 122 The court viewed the TEC's reasoning as so violative of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution that it assumed the state-
ments were unintentional. 123 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial
court's judgment affirming the order of the TEC and held that the exemp-
114. 653 S.W.2d at 561.
115. 644 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
116. Id at 180-81. Section 11.20 of the Property Tax Code provides:
(a) An organization that qualifies as a religious organization as provided
by Subsection (c) of this section is entitled to an exemption from taxation of:
(1) the real property that is owned by the religious organization, is
usedprimarily as a place of regular religious worship, and is reasonably
necessary for engaging in religious worship;
(e) For the purpose of this section, "religious worship" means individual
or group ceremony or meditation, education, and fellowship, the purpose of
which is to manifest or develop reverence, homage, and commitment in behalf
of a religious faith.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.20 (Vernon 1982) (emphasis added).
117. 644 S.W.2d at 180.
118. 653 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
119. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-17(g)(5)(E) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
120. Id.
121. The Christian Jew Foundation, formerly the Christian Jew Hour, devotes most of
its time to publishing literature and conducting radio broadcasts for the purpose of inform-
ing the public of its faith.




tion was available to the appellant. 24
B. Paving Assessments
The Texas Supreme Court rendered an extremely significant decision
regarding paving assessments shortly after the end of the survey period. In
Haynes v. City of Abilene 25 the appellants contested the city's paving as-
sessment of $13.94 per square foot of property abutting a recently paved
local street. Although the appellants' properties did abut the improved
road in the strict physical sense, there was no direct access to the road due
to a large plaster wall that ran the length of the abutting portion of the
properties. In determining the assessment amount, the city council had
heard testimony from a certified real estate appraiser that all property
abutting the recently paved street would be enhanced in value by at least
$14.94 per square foot. The council acted accordingly, assessing each own-
er of abutting property $13.94 per front foot of property abutting the im-
proved road.' 26 The appellants argued that assessing their properties
based on a valuation using the front foot plan was inequitable because
they received no special benefits from the city's decision to repave the
road. ' 27
The supreme court agreed with the landowners' position and reversed
the appellate court, holding the paving assessments void and unenforce-
able. 128 Although the improved road did increase all local property val-
ues, the court held that the article 1105(b) concept of special benefits
required that assessed property receive some additional special benefit
over and above the general benefit of increased neighborhood property
values. 129 The court consequently held that the assessment in question
was materially greater than the benefits conferred by the improvements;
therefore the assessment violated article I, section 17 of the Texas Consti-
124. Id. at 617.
125. 659 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1983).
126. The actual assessment was reduced by $1.00 from the amount actually authorized
because the appellants' lots abutted the street from the rear rather than the front.
127. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1105(b), § 7 (Vernon 1963) provides:
The part of the cost of improvements on each portion of highway ordered
improved which may be assessed against abutting property and owners
thereof shall be apportioned among the parcels of abutting property and own-
ers thereof, in accordance with the Front Foot Plan or Rule provided that if
the application of this rule would, in the opinion of the Governing Body, in
particular cases, result in injustice or inequality, it shall be the duiy ofsaidBody
to apportion and assess said costs in such proportion as it may deem just and
equitable, having in view the special benefits in enhanced value to be received by
such parcels ofproperty and owners thereof, the equities of such owners, and
the adjustment of such apportionment so as to produce a substantial equality
of benefits received and burdens imposed. (Emphasis added.)
The front foot plan calculates each individual property owner's assessment as the product of
the total amount of assessments for the improvements multiplied by a fraction, the numera-
tor of which is the total square feet of such owner's property that abuts the improved road
and the denominator of which is the total amount of square feet of all property abutting the
improved road.
128. 659 S.W.2d at 642, rev'g 645 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983).
129. 659 S.W.2d at 641.
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tution, which prohibits the taking of private property for a public use with-
out just compensation. 30
The Houston court of appeals in City of Houston v. Alnoa G. Corp. '31
held that the city's application of the front foot plan 32 to the appellee's
irregularly shaped lots was arbitrary and capricious. Any paving assess-
ment based on the use of that plan was therefore unenforceable. 33 The
court affirmed the trial court's holding that the assessment was constitu-
tionally impermissible because: (1) the improvements benefitted the public
generally and did not provide any special benefits to the appellee; (2) the
appellee's lots were substantially different in character and not properly
subject to assessment on the basis of the front foot plan; and (3) the city
had not produced any evidence regarding the fair market value of the ap-
pellee's property before and after implementation of the improvements for
which the assessments were made. 134
In Cook v. City ofAddison 13 various property owners sought to set aside
paving assessments levied by a home rule city, claiming that the city paid
the contractor out of general revenue funds and subsequently levied as-
sessments on the appellees' property to reimburse the city's general reve-
nue account. The court acknowledged that a home rule city has full power
of self-government, subject only to limitations promulgated by the Texas
and United States Constitutions and the general laws of Texas that appear
with "unmistakable clarity."1 36 The court found nothing in article 1105b,
section 9 limiting a home rule city's power to levy paving assessments and
reimburse its general revenue account. 137 Moreover, the court concluded
that the statute specifically contemplates such action by the city and actu-
ally prohibits the city's collection of any assessments until after the project
is completed and accepted. 38 Consequently, the paving assessments were
130. Id; see City of Houston v. Blackbird, 394 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex. 1965); Hutcheson
v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 690, 51 S.W. 848, 851 (1899); see also Village of Norwood v. Baker,
172 U.S. 269 (1898) (Ohio village assessment without consideration of special benefits vio-
lates 14th amendment due process).
131. 638 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
132. The front foot plan is described supra note 127.
133. 638 S.W.2d at 517.
134. Id. Although the court denied the appellee damages for the loss of ability to sell the
property while the invalid assessment lien was pending, it implied that such damages may be
recoverable if the property owner presents adequate evidence that actual damages resulted
from an invalid assessment. See id. at 518.
135. 656 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
136. Id. at 653-54; see Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d
641, 645 (Tex. 1975) (only legislative limitations that appear with "unmistakable clarity"
limit power of a home rule city).
137. 656 S.W.2d at 654. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. l105b, § 9 (Vernon 1963)
provides:
[T]he governing body shall have power to . . . determine the amounts of as-
sessments and all other matters necessary, and by ordinance to close such
hearing and levy such assessments before, during or after the construction of
such improvements, but no part of any assessment shall be made to mature
prior to acceptance by the city of the improvements for which assessment is
levied.
138. 656 S.W.2d at 654.
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valid and enforceable. 139
IV. ELECTIONS AND ELECTED OFFICIALS
A. Bond Elections
In Exparte Progresso Independent School District 140 the court of appeals
held that a school bond election was valid even though conducted pursu-
ant to an unconstitutional election statute. The appellants contended that
section 20.04 of the Texas Education Code, which requires that issuance of
school bonds be approved by a majority of voters who own taxable prop-
erty submitted for taxation, 14 1 denied equal protection to otherwise quali-
fied voters. Based upon several United States Supreme Court cases
holding that property ownership is an invalid prerequisite to the exercise
of voting rights, 142 the court held the Texas statute unconstitutional as de-
nying equal protection to those who did not render their property for taxa-
tion.' 43 The court also held, however, that the election itself was valid
since the school district had not enforced the unconstitutional provisions of
the statute, and accordingly struck down the property-rendering require-
ments of the statute, but held the remainder of the statute valid. 144
B. Elected Officials
Two cases decided during the survey period dealt with the requirement
that a candidate for elected office in Texas be in strict compliance with the
Texas Election Code. 45 In Sparks v. Busby 146 the Tyler court of appeals
139. The Cook court also rejected the appellant's contention that the city's use of the
front foot plan, without consideration of the irregular dimensions and present use of the
appellant's property, was arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, void. The court declined
to follow the holding of City of Houston v. Alnoa G. Corp., 638 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.), to the extent that it stood for the proposition that
use of the front foot plan was impermissible based solely on evidence that the assessed prop-
erty had irregular dimensions. 656 S.W.2d at 656. The court concluded that the "mere
showing of . . . a difference in size, shape or square footage of tracts abutting a street is
insufficient" to show that the use of the front foot plan would result in injustice or inequality
and thereby render the assessment invalid. Id. at 656.
140. 650 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
141. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 20.04(a) (Vernon 1972) provides:
No such bonds shall be issued and none of the aforesaid taxes shall be levied
unless authorized by a majority of the resident, qualified electors of the dis-
trict, who own taxable property therein and who have duly rendered the samefor
taxation, voting at an election held for such purpose ....
(Emphasis added.)
142. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (Texas law giving greater weight to
property-owning taxpayers in library bond election unconstitutional); City of Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (property ownership as prerequisite to general bond elec-
tion unconstitutional); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 702 (1969) (bond election re-
stricted to property taxpayers unconstitutional); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621 (1969) (eligibility to vote for school board members limited to property owners or
parents of children enrolled in local public school unconstitutional).
143. 650 S.W.2d at 162.
144. Id. at 163.
145. Provisions of the Texas Election Code relating to voters are to be liberally construed
as directory only, but those provisions relating to the requirements of a candidate for office
are mandatory and require strict compliance. See, e.g., McWaters v. Tucker, 249 S.W.2d 80,
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affirmed the trial court's order granting an injunction prohibiting the
county clerk from placing the appellant's name on the ballot as an in-
dependent candidate for county judge. The court held that the provisions
of the Election Code relating to a candidate's eligibility for office are
mandatory and require strict compliance. 47 Because several of the signa-
tures on the appellant's petition for a place on the ballot were invalid due
to procedural technicalities, the appellant lacked the minimum number of
signatures to qualify and an injunction was appropriate under the
circumstances. 4 8
In Branaum v. Patrick 149 the appellant alleged that the appellee violated
the Texas Election Code by accepting a campaign contribution and mak-
ing a campaign expenditure prior to filing the name of his campaign treas-
urer with the appropriate authorities. 50 One week before appointing his
campaign treasurer, appellee loaned his campaign $400 and used that sum
to pay the required filing fee. The court held that although the statutory
provision requiring appointment of a campaign treasurer was mandatory,
the time for such appointment was only directory.' 5' The court concluded
that the appellee had substantially complied with the statutory
requirements. 52
82 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1952, no writ); see also Shields v. Upham, 597 S.W.2d 502
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ) (failure of nominating petition to show street ad-
dress or county in which registered to vote held insufficient compliance); Geiger v. Debusk,
534 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (failure to attach affidavit in lieu of
filing fee resulted in withdrawal of name from ballot).
146. 639 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
147. Id. at 717; see also Shields v. Upham, 597 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1980, no writ) (candidate denied place on ballot because only seven of 211 voters signing
petition had listed city of their residence as required by statute); Brown v. Walker, 377
S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1964) (candidate who sent his assessment by first class mail rather than
certified or registered mail denied slot on ballot).
148. 639 S.W.2d at 718. In contrast to the Sparks case the Houston court of appeals held
that (1) a candidate's application for a place on the ballot is not invalid merely because
certain voters failed to identify the city of their residence and (2) TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art.
13.50 (Vernon Supp. 1984), prohibiting an independent candidate's petition for a place on
the ballot from being circulated until the day after a primary runoff election, has no applica-
tion where no primary runoff is held for that year. Hoot v. Brewer, 640 S.W.2d 758, 761
(Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1982, no writ).
149. 643 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
150. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 14.02(F)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides:
Except as expressly permitted in this chapter, no contribution as defined in
Section 237(D)(I) shall be accepted nor any expenditure, as defined in Section
237(E)(1), including thepaying of anyflingfee, made by an individual until he
has filed the name of his campaign treasurer with the appropriate authority.
(Emphasis added.) Specifically, the appellant, a candidate, sought civil damages from an-
other candidate under art. 14.04 of the Political Funds and Reporting Disclosure Act of
1975, id art. 14.04 (Vernon Supp. 1984). The Act makes a candidate liable to any opposing
candidate for knowingly making an unlawful campaign expenditure. The amount of liabil-
ity is twice the value of the expenditure. Id
151. 643 S.W.2d at 751; accord Hoeneke v. Lehman, 542 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ) (filing of campaign expense statement is mandatory, but
time of filing is directory).
152. 643 S.W.2d at 751; accord Butchofsky v. Crawford, 269 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1954, no writ) (substantial compliance with Election Code requirement of
statement showing gifts received is sufficient if irregularity did not affect result of election).
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In one of the more interesting election cases occurring during the survey
period, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
ruled that the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Clements v.
Fashing 53 applied retroactively. In Smith v. Dean154 the appellant re-
signed his office as mayor of Mesquite, Texas, and announced his candi-
dacy for the Texas Legislature while the Clements case was on appeal to
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the district
court's decision in Clements, which held unconstitutional article III, sec-
tion 19 of the Texas Constitution. 155 The provision requires that a person
holding a lucrative office wait until his respective term expires before run-
ning for the Texas Legislature. 156 The Texas secretary of state, acting on
the authority of the Supreme Court's decision, informed Smith that he was
ineligible to be a candidate for the legislature because he held a lucrative
office and his term had not yet expired at the time he resigned from office.
His name was therefore withdrawn from the ballot. Smith sued to enjoin
the secretary from interfering with his candidacy, contending that the
Supreme Court decision did not apply to his candidacy because he had
announced his intention to run for the legislature at a time when the stat-
ute had been held unconstitutional.
The district court held that the appellant's salary of $100 per month
clearly made his position a lucrative office and that the circumstances of
the case failed to establish that the Clements decision should not apply
retroactively. 57 Under the balancing test for determining nonretroactiv-
ity, a party must show that the new decision either (1) establishes a new
principle of law or (2) overrules clear past precedent. 58 Finding that the
overruled district court and Fifth Circuit decisions in Clements failed to
establish clear past precedent, the court concluded that "[o]ne who relies
on a case that is pending on appeal assumes the risk that the case may be
reversed and that his reliance may be misplaced."'
59
V. ANNEXATION AND INCORPORATION
The Texas Supreme Court decided only one significant case concerning
153. 457 U.S. 957 (1982). In Fashing v. Moore, 489 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Tex. 1980), the
district court held unconstitutional certain provisions of the Texas Election Code and the
Texas Constitution that (1) prohibited persons holding specified offices, as well as lucrative
offices, from running for the Texas Legislature prior to expiration of their original term of
office and (2) provided that certain other persons holding office were deemed to have auto-
matically resigned their present office when they announced candidacy for another office.
The provisions were held violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and, therefore, unconstitutional. Id at 475. The Fifth Circuit affirmed without opin-
ion. Fashing v. Moore, 631 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1980). The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that such legislative provisions bore a rational relationship to certain legit-
imate state objectives and therefore were constitutional. 457 U.S. at 968-69.
154. 554 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
155. 457 U.S. at 968-69.
156. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 19.
157. 554 F. Supp. at 31.
158. Id; see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
159. 554 F. Supp. at 31.
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
annexation during the survey period. In City of Longview v. State of Texas
ex rel Spring Hill Utility District 160 the supreme court reversed the Tyler
court of appeals and held that a water district may be annexed in its en-
tirety by a series of ordinances rather than a single ordinance. 16 1 The
Spring Hill Water District was located on three separate tracts of land.
Only one tract was adjacent to the city of Longview and came within its
three and one-half mile extraterritorial jurisdiction. 62 The city annexed
the adjacent tract by one ordinance, then annexed a narrow strip of land
leading to the other two smaller strips by a second ordinance, by the third
and fourth ordinances the city annexed the final two tracts of the water
district, thereby annexing the entire water district as required by statute. 1
63
The state brought a quo warranto action alleging that the annexation
was void. The trial court rendered judgment validating the annexation,
and the court of appeals reversed, holding that article 970a required the
entire district to be annexed in a single ordinance. 164 The court of appeals
reasoned that because the city had not complied with the statute in the first
ordinance, the final three ordinances were also invalid. 165
The supreme court noted that article 970a, section 3(C) states that when
a city annexes additional territory the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction ex-
pands to conform with the annexed area. 166 Consequently, the court con-
cluded that the final two tracts came within the city's extraterritorial
jurisdiction as a result of its having validly annexed the first tract. 167 Since
the entire district was annexed by the city within the proper time frame,
the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and reversed the court of
appeals. 168
In Town of Hudson Oaks v. State ex re. City of Weatherford169 the Fort
Worth court of appeals was asked to decide whether a town that attempted
to incorporate, but held its incorporation election on a date not authorized
by statute, 170 was rendered duly incorporated by a validating act of the
160. 657 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1983).
161. Id at 431. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 11(B) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-
1983) requires that a water district be annexed in its entirety if at all. See infra notes 163
(text of statute).
162. Article 1175 limits a home rule city's power to annex territory to property located
adjacent to the city's territory. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1175 (Vernon 1963). Id art.
970a, § 7 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983) further limits a city's power to annex territory to
property within the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction.
163. Id art. 970a, § II(B) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983) provides: "A city may not
annex territory within the boundaries of a water or sewer district unless it annexes the entire
portion of the district that is outside the city's boundaries."
164. 642 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982), rev'd, 657 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1983).
165. 642 S.W.2d at 550.
166. 657 S.W.2d at 631; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 3(C) (Vernon 1963).
167. 657 S.W.2d at 631;see May v. City of McKinney, 479 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
168. 657 S.W.2d at 431. Article 970a, § 6 provides that the annexation of a territory shall
be complete within 90 days or it is null and void. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 6
(Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983).
169. 646 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
170. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 2.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) specifies the dates on
which incorporation elections may be held.
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legislature. Article 974d-30 declares all those towns that attempted to
incorporate or functioned as incorporated towns but were not actually in-
corporated due to procedural technicalities validly incorporated. 17 ' The
court placed special emphasis on language in article 974d-30 stating that
the incorporation proceedings would not be invalidated merely because
the city failed to comply with the legal procedures. 172 The court concluded
that although the two statutes were in direct conflict, the validating statute
controlled; therefore Hudson Oaks became incorporated as of the date of
its invalid election.' 73
VI. TORT LIABILITY
The Texas courts decided several significant cases regarding municipal
and governmental tort liability during the survey period. In Salcedo v. El
Paso Hospital District'74 the Texas Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
states a cause of action under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) 17 5 when
he or she alleges that a public hospital employee wrongfully and negli-
gently misread and misinterpreted graph charts from an electrocardiogram
test and that such negligence caused the patient's death. In Salcedo the
plaintiff's husband entered the hospital complaining of severe chest pains.
Although the results of the electrocardiogram test showed a classic case of
myocardial infarction (heart attack), Mr. Salcedo was released from the
hospital shortly afterward. He collapsed and died shortly after returning
home. Mrs. Salcedo sued the El Paso Hospital District and the doctor who
treated her husband for negligence. The trial court held that Mrs.
Salcedo's cause of action failed to come within the provisions of the TTCA
waiving sovereign immunity. The court of appeals affirmed the holding of
the trial court.' 76 Section 3 of the TTCA provides for waiver of sovereign
immunity when the injury results from: (1) use of publicly owned vehicles,
(2) defects in publicly owned premises, or (3) some condition or use of
171. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 974d-30 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-1983).
172. 646 S.W.2d at 611.
173. Id. at 612.
174. 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983).
175. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) reads:
Each unit of government in the state shall be liable for money damages for
property damage or personal injuries or death when proximately caused by
the negligence or wrongful act of omission of any officer or employee acting
within the scope of his employment or office arising from the operation or use
of a motor-driven vehicle and motor-driven equipment, other than motor-
driven equipment used in connection with the operation of floodgates or water
release equipment by river authorities created under the laws of this state,
under circumstances where such officer or employee would be personally lia-
ble to the claimant in accordance with the law of this state, or death or per-
sonal injuries so caused from some condition or some use of tangible property,
real or personal, under circumstances where such unit of government, if a pri-
vate person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of this
state. (Emphasis added.)
176. 647 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983).
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public property.177 Mrs. Salcedo asserted that her claim fell within the last
exception, but the trial court dismissed the claim for failure to allege that
the property itself (the electrocardiogram machine) was in a defective
condition.
The supreme court reversed both lower court rulings, holding that a
cause of action is stated under the TTCA if the plaintiff alleges that some
use rather than some condition of the property was a contributing factor to
the injury in question.178 The court emphasized that the Texas Legislature
had not bothered to amend the waiver provision of the TTCA since the
court's decision in Lowe v. Texas Tech University. 179 In Lowe Chief Jus-
tice Greenhill stated in his concurring opinion that because of the ambigu-
ous language of section 3, allegations of either defective or nondefective
property could invoke the waiver provisions of the TTCA. ' 80 The Salcedo
court reasoned that because the legislature had failed to express its intent
more clearly since the Lowe decision, the court was bound to give a liberal
construction to the statute.' 8' Consequently, Mrs. Salcedo's allegation of
wrongful use of the property sufficiently stated a cause of action under the
TTCA.
In Genzer v. City of Mission 182 the appellant sought damages from the
city pursuant to the TTCA for injuries sustained in connection with the
allegedly negligent operation of a fireworks display. Although the display
was sponsored by the Catholic War Veterans Post, the evidence showed
that (1) volunteer members of the city's fire department conducted the dis-
play; (2) paid members of the city's fire and police department supervised
local traffic, as well as the display itself; and (3) the display was conducted
on city-owned property. Based upon this evidence, the jury found that the
city was responsible for the display and was negligent in failing to keep the
crowds at a safe distance from the fireworks and in setting the fireworks
mortars at an angle toward the crowd.
The court of appeals held that the city had exercised a governmental
function by supervising and conducting the display. The city was there-
fore liable for the negligent operation of the fireworks display under the
TTCA. 183 The court failed, however, to specify the particular waiver pro-
vision of the TTCA 84 upon which the appellant's claim was based. Ar-
guably the court concluded that since the city had negligently conducted
the display on city-owned property, the claim fell within that provision
177. 659 S.W.2d at 31; see Greenhill & Murto, Governmental Immunity, 49 TEX. L. REV.
462, 468 (1971).
178. 659 S.W.2d at 32.
179. 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976).
180. Id. at 302. "The statutory language 'condition or use' of property implies that such
property was furnished, was in bad or defective condition or was wrongly used." Id.
181. 659 S.W.2d at 32. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 13 (Vernon 1970)
provides: "The provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed to achieve the purposes
ereof."
182. No. 2561CV (May 26, 1983).
183. Id, slip op. at 4.
184. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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waiving immunity for injuries arising out of conditions or use of public
property. 185
The Amarillo court of appeals held that the city of Amarillo was liable
for damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983186 and the TTCA when plain-
tiffs presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that use of excessive force
by the local police amounted to an implementation of official departmental
policy. In City of Amarillo v. Langley 187 the Langley brothers were riding
their motorcycles through downtown Amarillo when they ran a red light.
A local police officer began chasing them and radioed ahead to other of-
ficers informing them of his pursuit. Another officer who heard the call
185. See id Although the reasoning in Genzer is far from clear, the decision may be
reconciled with the supreme court's opinion in Salcedo four months later. In light of the
Salcedo opinion one may read Genzer as standing for the proposition that the city of Mis-
sion had negligently used city property by conducting and supervising the fireworks display
in a negligent manner on that property. Thus, the claim, when construed in light of the
Salcedo case, would fall within the § 3 waiver provision of the TTCA. The apparent rea-
soning employed by the Genzer court is that negligent supervision of activities occurring on
publicly owned property constitutes the negligent use of that property. This conclusion is
supported by the more recent case of Smith v. University of Tex., 665 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1984, no writ). In that case the plaintiff was injured when he was struck in the
head by a shot during a shot put competition held in connection with a track and field meet
conducted at the University of Texas in Austin. The Smith court cited Salcedo in support of
its holding that the TTCA waives sovereign immunity whenever a state university negli-
gently supervises a track and field meet conducted on university property. Although it is
clear that Salcedo removes the necessity of pleading that plaintiff's injuries resulted from a
defective physical condition of public property as opposed to a negligent use of nondefective
property, it is not clear that the supreme court intended to extend its holding in Salcedo to
situations where the only negligence attributable to the municipality is in the form of negli-
gent supervision of public property. It would appear that unless the Texas Legislature or the
exas Supreme Court clarifies the holding of Salcedo there may be a multitude of suits
brought against local government bodies alleging that an injury suffered in connection with
an event held on publicly owned property was the direct result of the local body's failure to
properly supervise that event. This possibility threatens to eliminate whatever is left of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in Texas and should certainly chill the incentive of local
governments to sponsor or allow activities for the benefit of the public at large to be held on
publicly owned property.
In addition to the Genzer and Salcedo decisions, the Houston court of appeals held that
the Texas Department of Corrections was liable under the TTCA for supplying an inmate
with a defective tool belt for use in performing certain electric lineman functions at the
prison. Texas Dep't of Corrections v. Jackson, 661 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Houston lIst
Dist.] 1983, no writ).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
This statute has been interpreted to allow private citizens to sue states and local governing
bodies for deprivation of their constitutional rights. The United States Supreme Court held
in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that "[liocal governing bod-
ies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive
relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes
a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body's officers." Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
187. 651 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ).
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placed his patrol car in the middle of the street on which the Langleys were
travelling, creating a barricade. A violent crash ensued. The Langleys
were severely injured and filed suit against the city of Amarillo under sec-
tion 1983 and the TTCA. They alleged that the use of the barricade con-
stituted excessive force, resulted in a deprivation of their constitutional
rights, and constituted official departmental policy. The court initially dis-
cussed the test for determining municipal liability under section 1983, as
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of
Social Services. 88 According to the court of appeals, under Monell the
proper inquiries are "whether (1) there was a municipal policy or custom
that, (2) when executed or implemented, (3) produced a constitutional tort,
(4) causing injury to the plaintiff."' 8 9 The court first recognized that the
exercise of excessive force by a police officer was a constitutional viola-
tion.' 90 The court then concluded that the plaintiff had presented suffi-
cient evidence from which the jury could conclude that such excessive
force (the use of barricades) was a form of official police department pol-
icy, and that such policy's implementation by the officer directly resulted
in injury to the Langleys.' 91
The Langley court also held that the plaintiffs had stated a proper cause
of action under the TTCA. The city contended that it was immune from
suit under the circumstances by virtue of subsections 14(9) and (10) of the
TTCA, which exempt municipalities from coverage under the TTCA if the
underlying claim arises from any act or omission resulting from civil diso-
bedience or an act constituting an intentional tort. 192 The court rejected
the city's contention because, as a matter of law, a riot under subsection
14(9) pertained to disturbances involving a mass of people acting together
unlawfully; 193 and, further, there had not been a jury finding that the ex-
188. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
189. 651 S.W.2d at 913.
190. Id., see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Clark v. Ziedonis, 513 F.2d 79
(7th Cir. 1975); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
191. 651 S.W.2d at 913-14. In another § 1983 case decided during the survey period, the
Fifth Circuit held that where a city employee is denied a merit wage increase in retaliation
for his filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the em-
ployee may have a cause of action under title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act; however,
absent evidence that such retaliation was a form of official departmental custom or policy,
the employee has no cause of action under § 1983. Lopez v. City of Austin, 710 F.2d 196
(5th Cir. 1983).
192. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19, § 14(9)-(10) (Vernon 1970) provides that
the provisions of the TTCA shall not apply to:
(9) Any claim based on an injury or death connected with any act or omis-
sion arising out of civil disobedience, riot, insurrection or rebellion or arising
out of the failure to provide, or the method of providing, police or fire protec-
tion.
(10) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any
other intentional tort including, but not limited to, disciplinary action by
school authorities.
193. 651 S.W.2d at 918 (citing Forbus v. City of Denton, 595 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Civ.




cessive force in question constituted an intentional tort. 194
VII. OPEN RECORDS ACT
Two interesting cases were decided during the survey period interpret-
ing the Texas Open Records Act. 195 In Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Texas
Newspapers, Inc. 196 the newspaper requested disclosure of the names and
qualifications of persons being considered for the position of president at
Texas A&M University. The appellant, pursuant to his role as executive
director of the search advisory committee, requested an opinion from the
Texas attorney general regarding disclosure of the materials requested.
The attorney general ruled that the information must be disclosed. When
the appellant continued to withhold the information, the newspaper ob-
tained a writ of mandamus from the district court to compel disclosure.
The Austin court of appeals, in affirming the issuance of the writ, rejected
the appellant's position that the information requested was exempt from
disclosure as confidential or, alternatively, that the materials were person-
nel files containing information subject to privacy restrictions. 197 The ap-
pellant urged the court to interpret the act's invasion of privacy exception
by using a balancing test, weighing the person's right to privacy against the
public's interest in disclosure.1 98 The court rejected this contention, hold-
ing that application of the privacy exception should be guided by the
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Industrial Foundation of the South v.
Texas Industrial Accident Board.199 In Industrial Foundation the supreme
court held that the legislature intended the confidential information ex-
emption to cover information that (1) contains very intimate or embarrass-
ing facts whose publication would be highly objectionable to a reasonable
person and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public.2°° The appellant
contended that the court should treat the invasion of privacy exemption
differently from the confidential information exemption by using the bal-
ancing test. The court disagreed, holding that the standard announced in
194. 651 S.W.2d at 918.
195. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides
that "[aill information collected, assembled, or maintained by governmental bodies" shall be
available for public inspection unless expressly exempted from coverage by the statute.
196. 652 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
197. Id. at 549. Section 3(a) of the Open Records Act exempts the following from its
coverage: "(1) information deemed confidential by law, either Constitutional, statutory, or
by judicial decision; (2) information in personnel files, the disclosure of which would consti-
tute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(l)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
198. The federal Freedom of Information Act provides that requested material is exempt
from disclosure if disclosure would amount to a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(6) (1982). The federal courts balance the competing interests
of the individual's right of privacy against the public's interest in gaining access to the infor-
mation. See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) (permitting
access to summaries of honor board hearings); Campbell v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 539 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1976) (exempting report on agency inspection of personnel
management).
199. 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977).
200. 540 S.W.2d at 685.
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Industrial Foundation was equally applicable to the invasion of privacy
exemption.20 1 The court concluded that the information requested was not
highly objectionable, was the subject of legitimate public concern, and
therefore was subject to disclosure. 202
In Calvert v. Employees Retirement System20 3 the appellant requested
disclosure of the names and addresses of all retired appellate court judges
in the State of Texas. The attorney general ruled that state statutes
deemed the information confidential and therefore exempt from disclo-
sure.204 The appellant sought a declaratory judgment that the records
were subject to disclosure and a writ of mandamus compelling such disclo-
sure. The appellee argued that the records in question came within the
confidential information exemption of the Act because they were specifi-
cally deemed confidential by applicable retirement statutes. The appellant
contended that because the retirement statutes also labeled the records as
personnel records they would be exempt only if they contained informa-
tion that, if disclosed, would clearly be an unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy.205 The court agreed with the appellant, concluding that disclosure of
the names and addresses of the judges would not constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of privacy, and accordingly ordered the records
disclosed. 206
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
Several cases decided during the survey period are not capable of being
easily categorized. They are nevertheless worthy of some discussion in an
article addressing local government law. The cases are broadly subdivided
into the general areas of (1) procedural matters and (2) interpretation of
local statutes, regulations, or ordinances.
A. Procedural Matters
Toxas courts decided two significant cases regarding procedural matters
during the survey period. In Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Service Com-
mission v. Martinez20 7 the Texas Supreme Court, without hearing oral ar-
guments, reversed a court of appeals decision and upheld the indefinite
suspension of a police officer. The lower court had held that the suspen-
201. 652 S.W.2d at 550-5 I. Justice Powers, in his dissent, stated that the exemption on its
face required a balancing test. "The plain meaning of the term 'clearly unwarranted' im-
plies in the strongest possible terms that the decision to disclose the information depends
upon a balancing test. ... Id at 559 n.4.
202. Id at 551.
203. 648 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ refd. n.r.e.).
204. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. I lOB, § 13.402 (Vernon 1981) (formerly art. 6228k)
provides that records kept in the custody of statewide retirement systems shall be considered
personnel records and confidential information. The Open Records Act treats the two clas-
sifications as separate exemptions. See supra note 197. The Hubert court, however, held
that the same standard should apply to both exemptions. 652 S.W.2d at 550-51.
205. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
206. 648 S.W.2d at 420-21.
207. 645 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. 1983).
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sion violated the Civil Service Act for Firemen and Policemen because it
was not preceded by written notice referring to and quoting the particular
civil service rule allegedly violated. 20 8 The supreme court held that the
notice was sufficient because it substantially complied with the statute, re-
gardless of its failure to meet the strict technical requirements. 20 9
In District Judges v. Gregg County2 10 the court of appeals concluded that
if the legislature fails to provide for a county-funded court administration
system, 21' the judges of that county may have inherent power to order the
county to fund expenditures proven essential to the proper administration
of justice.212 Although the judges in Gregg County had the power to com-
pel the county to fund a computer system and salaried personnel to run it,
the court held that such expenditures were not shown to be essential to the
proper administration of justice. Accordingly, the court denied a writ of
mandamus seeking to compel the county to fund the expenditures. 213
R. Interpretations of Statutes, Regulations, and Ordinances
In University of Texas Health Science Center v. Babb2 14 the court held
that a school's curriculum catalog constitutes a written contract between
the educational institution and the student where entrance is gained under
its terms. 215 The appellee entered and temporarily withdrew from the uni-
versity in the fall of 1979, then re-entered in the spring of 1980. Under the
new catalog in effect at the time of re-entry, the university had a new re-
striction regarding grades that disqualified the appellee from continuing
her education at the university. The trial court issued an injunction
prohibiting the university from interfering with the appellee's education.
208. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 16 (Vernon 1963) requires the chief of the
police department, whenever he suspends an officer, to file a written statement of notice
stating the particular rule alleged to have been violated and detailing the acts constituting
the violation of such rule.
209. 645 S.W.2d at 432. The court cited a previous decision on the same issue and stated
that "'substantial compliance is had ... when the letter of suspension sufficiently apprises
the officer of the charges against him and the facts relied upon to prove those charges ...
[T]he charges need not meet the precision or technicality of a criminal indictment.' " Id.
(quoting Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Lockhart, 626 S.W.2d 492, 494
(Tex. 1981)). During the survey period the Texas Supreme Court, again without hearing
oral arguments, overruled another appellate court's decision on identical grounds. See City
of Laredo v. Guerrero, 649 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. 1983).
210. 657 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
211. Many counties in Texas have a court administration system that is funded by the
county pursuant to TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1918a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
212. 657 S.W.2d at 910; see also Vondy v. Commissioners Court, 620 S.W.2d 104 (Tex.
1981) (duty to set reasonable salary for constable).
213. 657 S.W.2d at 910. The court reasoned that although the burden of proof is on the
party challenging judicial expenditures when the judicial branch has been given authority
by the legislature to make such expenditures, the burden shifts when the judiciary seeks to
use its inherent power to spend. In the latter situation the judicial branch must show that
the expenditures are essential to the proper administration of justice. Id.; see also In re
Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976) (holding improper a court
order increasing salary for juvenile director).
214. 646 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1982, no writ).
215. 1d. at 506.
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The court of appeals, in upholding the order, concluded that the appellee
was entitled to rely on the old catalog under which she originally entered
the university and that the school was bound by the terms and conditions
of that catalog.216
In Board of Regents v. Denton Construction Co. 217 the appellee-contrac-
tor received consent from the Texas Legislature to sue North Texas State
University for the alleged breach of a construction contract. The trial
court awarded the appellee exemplary as well as compensatory damages.
The court of appeals held that legislative consent to sue, though inter-
preted broadly, only authorized recovery of the actual damages suffered by
appellee and did not authorize recovery for lost profits or exemplary dam-
ages against the university. 2' 8
The Dallas court of appeals was asked to decide whether a statutory
requirement that public contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder pre-
cluded a housekeeping contract from being awarded to the third lowest
bidder. 219 In Corbin v. Collin County Commissioners Court220 the appellee
awarded a housekeeping contract to the third lowest bidder because of its
superior equipment, skill, and experience. The court held that since the
county had reserved its statutory right to reject any and all bids,221 the
awarding of the contract to a party other than the lowest bidder did not
violate the statute.222
In Benbrook Water & Sewer Authority v. City of Benbrook 223 the Fort
Worth court of appeals held that the water and sewer authority was obli-
gated to pay for relocation of water and sewer mains necessitated by the
city's reconstruction and improvement of local streets.224 The authority
argued that since it had the power to condemn private property for a pub-
lic purpose, its dominion over local streets was equivalent to that of the
city and therefore it was not obligated to pay for the relocation costs. 225
The court rejected this argument and concluded that the authority's do-
216. Id.
217. 652 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
218. Id at 591-93. One other case involving legislative consent to sue the state occurred
during the survey period. The Austin court of appeals held that legislative consent to sue the
state for overpayment of taxes did not suspend the effect of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-1.05 (Vernon Supp. 1984) providing for post-judgment interest. The appellee was
therefore entitled to post-judgment interest on its overpayment. State v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
654 S.W.2d 45, 47-48 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2368a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1984) requires that public
contracts be given to the lowest bidder.
220. 651 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
221. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2368a, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) provides that the
city "shall have the right to reject any and all bids." See A & A Constr. Co. v. City of
Corpus Christi, 527 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ) (city had
statutory right to reject lowest bid on construction contract).
222. 651 S.W.2d at 56-57.
223. 653 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
224. Id. at 324.
225. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1433 (Vernon 1980) allows a water authority to
condemn private property with the consent of the local governing body.
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minion over local streets was subservient to the city's and, consequently,
the authority should pay for the relocation of water and sewage
facilities. 226
226. 653 S.W.2d at 323-24; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1433 (Vernon 1980) (use
of streets by water corporations is subject to the consent of local governing body); TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1016 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (general law city has exclusive control over
its streets and thoroughfares); see also City of San Antonio v. Bexar Metropolitan Water
Dist., 309 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, writ ref'd) (water district re-
quired to conform water mains to street improvements made by city).
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